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ABSTRACT
In a model with housing collateral, a decrease in house prices reduces the collateral value of housing,
increases household exposure to idiosyncratic risk, and increases the conditional market price of risk.
This collateral mechanism can quantitatively replicate the conditional and the cross-sectional
variation in risk premia on stocks for reasonable parameter values. The increase of the conditional
equity premium and Sharpe ratio when collateral is scarce in the model matches the increase
observed in US data. The model also generates a return spread of value firms over growth firms of
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The canonical consumption-based asset pricing model of Breeden (1979) and Lucas (1978)
implies small and roughly constant equity risk premia over time and little or no risk premium
variation in the cross-section. Yet, recent research in empirical asset pricing has documented
striking di®erences in risk premia between equity and bonds, between equity at di®erent
points in time, and between portfolios formed by sorting equities on their book-to-market ra-
tio. Time-variation in risk premia, documented, among others, by Ferson and Harvey (1991)
and Whitelaw (1997)), implies that returns are predictable (Cochrane (2001)). Many papers
have documented predictability, especially at longer holding periods.1 The predictability
comes mostly from changes in risk premia, rather than changes in expected dividend growth
(Campbell and Shiller (1988)). Recently, Jagannathan, McGrattan and Scherbina (2000)
and Fama and French (2002) have argued that there has been a long-run decline in US risk
premia. Risk premia also vary substantially across securities. According to Fama and French
(1992), value stocks earn returns that are on average six percent higher than growth stocks;
this premium is of the same size as the equity risk premium itself.
The two most common approaches to tackling the shortcomings of the Lucas-Breeden
model are changing the preferences2, or changing the dynamics of the aggregate consumption
process.3 The most successful model in the ¯rst class is arguably the habit formation model.
However, it is hard to ¯nd direct empirical evidence for this speci¯cation of preferences and
habit-style preferences have unappealing public policy implications (Ljungqvist and Uhlig
(2000)). As for the second approach, it is hard to distinguish between i.i.d. consumption
growth and a speci¯cation that includes a small, predictable component based on the avail-
1Fama and French (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1988), Cochrane (1991), Goetzman and Jorion (1993),
Hodrick (1992), and Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) ¯nd that the dividend-price ratio has predictive
power. Other variables have also been found to be powerful predictors of long horizon returns (e.g. Lamont
(1998), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), Menzly, Santos and Veronesi (2004), and Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2005a).
2Habit style preferences are most commonly used, see Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Ferson and
Constantinides (1991), Abel (1999), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Menzly et al. (2004) for early contri-
butions. Another approach is to model non-separable preferences over a second good, such as housing (Flavin
(2001) and Piazzesi, Schneider and Tuzel (2004)) or durables (Dunn and Singleton (1986), Eichenbaum and
Hansen (1990), and Yogo (2005))
3Bansal and Yaron (2004) introduce a small but very persistent component in aggregate consumption
and dividend growth. Bekaert, Engstrom and Grenadier (2004) combine this speci¯cation with habit style
preferences.
1able data. Furthermore, these models can only address the long-run decline in the US equity
premium through a radical change in the time series process for aggregate consumption
growth, which again is hard to detect in the data.4
Instead of staying within the representative agent framework, we introduce heterogeneity
among agents. Our focus is on the impact of time variation in risk sharing on asset prices.
In the model, households di®er only by their income histories. They share income risk
by trading contingent claims, but they cannot borrow more than the value of their house.
When housing collateral is scarce, collateral constraints constrain risk sharing more, and,
as a result, risk premia are higher. Thus, risk premia vary over time and with the housing
collateral ratio. This modest friction is a realistic one for an advanced economy like the US.5
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the endogenous time variation
in the amount of housing collateral can quantitatively account for three of the di®erences in
expected returns: between equity and the risk-free asset, between equity at di®erent points
in time, and between value and growth portfolios. In addition, our model replicates the
long-run decline in the equity premium and in the volatility of the risk-free rate in the US
during the second half of the 20th century. This paper ¯ts in a broader research agenda
that includes Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005a) and Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2005b). The second paper explains why regional consumption growth in the US is more
cross-correlated when the housing collateral supply increases. This ¯nding o®ers direct
support for the collateral mechanism. In the ¯rst paper, we test our model's Euler equation
on the cross-section of US stock returns. To do so, we take the returns from the data and
we approximate the wealth distribution, an unobservable, as a function of the collateral
ratio and consumption shocks. Our results provide qualitative support for the mechanism.
In the current paper, we generate the returns and the wealth distribution dynamics inside
4Lettau, Ludvigson and Wachter (2005) explore the e®ect of the apparent decline in aggregate consump-
tion growth volatility.
5Our emphasis on housing, rather than ¯nancial assets, re°ects three features of the US economy: the
participation rate in housing markets is very high (2/3 of households own their home), the value of the
residential real estate makes up over seventy-¯ve percent of total assets for the median household (Survey of
Consumer Finances, 2001), and housing is a prime source of collateral (75 percent of household borrowing
in the data is collateralized by housing wealth, US Flow of Funds, 2003). To keep the model exposition
simple, we abstract from ¯nancial assets or other kinds of capital (such as cars) that households may use to
collateralize loans. However, in the calibration we explore the e®ects of using a broader measure of collateral.
2the model, and we show the °uctuations in housing collateral can quantitatively explain
the variation in expected returns in a DSGE model, a key step in advancing the collateral
mechanism as a serious candidate for understanding asset returns.
Outline We start by brie°y setting up the model (section 1) and focus on its asset pricing
implications. The households trade a complete menu of assets, as in Lucas (1978), but
they face endogenous solvency constraints because they can repudiate their debts. When a
household chooses to repudiate its debts, it loses all its housing wealth but its labor income
is protected from creditors. The household is not excluded from trading.6 We carefully
calibrate the model in section 2.
As a ¯rst test, we feed the model seven decades worth of US data on aggregate consump-
tion growth and housing collateral ratio dynamics (section 3). We solve for the model-implied
equity premium and risk-free rate. After the great depression, the housing collateral ratio
decreases substantially which causes a dramatic increase in the equity premium and in the
risk-free rate volatility in the model. We document the same pattern in the data. In our
model, the subsequent increase in the US housing collateral ratio since the 1950s (the mort-
gage to income ratio increases from 12% to 100%) produces a decline in the equity premium
from 11% to 3.5% in 2002, consistent with the ¯ndings of Jagannathan et al. (2000). Equity
holders in the model earn large unexpected capital gains, especially in the 1990s. This is
what Fama and French (2002) ¯nd in the data. We also document a strong positive rela-
tionship in the data between the housing wealth-to-income ratio and the risk-free rate, the
key signature of the collateral mechanism in our model. Finally, we replicate the decline in
the volatility of stock and bond returns after the 1940s.
The model has two more distinguishing time-series properties. First, it implies that a
lower ratio of housing collateral wealth to total wealth, henceforth the housing collateral
ratio, predicts higher future excess returns. The predictability of returns in the model
6In Kehoe and Levine (1993), Krueger (2000), Kehoe and Perri (2002), and Krueger and Perri (2005),
limited commitment is also the source of incomplete risk-sharing. But the outside option upon default is
exclusion from all future risk sharing arrangements. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show how to decentralize
these Kehoe and Levine (1993) equilibria with sequential trade. Geanakoplos and Zame (2000) and Kubler
and Schmedders (2003) consider a di®erent environment in which individual assets collateralize individual
promises in a standard incomplete markets economy. We model the outside option as bankruptcy with loss
of all collateral assets; all promises are backed by all collateral assets.
3quantitatively matches the evidence in US stock returns documented in Lustig and Van
Nieuwerburgh (2005a). Second, the Sharpe ratio in the model is highly volatile, an important
feature of US data not accounted for by most equilibrium models. It also moves inversely
with the housing collateral ratio in US data. Figure 1 shows that the model's expected excess
return on equity (panel 1), its conditional volatility (panel 2), and the conditional Sharpe
ratio (panel 3) are all decreasing functions of the amount of housing collateral available in
the economy (horizontal axis).
[Figure 1 about here.]
The model also explains why risk premia vary so much across securities. According to
Fama and French (1992), value stocks earn returns that are on average six percent higher
than growth stocks. Our model replicates this feature of the data (section 4). Figure 2
shows that return spreads on book-to-market sorted portfolios predicted by the model line
up nicely with the same spreads in the data. Our model endogenously generates a positive
value premium when value stocks are short-duration assets. The reason lies in the term
structure of consumption risk premia it generates. In a recent paper, Lettau and Wachter
(2005) point out that, if value stocks are short-duration stocks and growth stocks long-
duration stocks, a positive value premium requires the term structure of consumption risk
premia to be downward sloping. Yet, the habit formation model of Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) generates an upward sloping term structure of consumption risk premia: Since a bad
consumption shock increases discount rates almost permanently, the price of long-maturity
consumption claims would fall by more. In other words, growth stocks would earn a larger
risk premium. In contrast, a bad consumption shock in our model increases discount rates
temporarily. It does not a®ect the collateral ratio, which governs discount rates in the long
run. As a result, the price of consumption strips of longer maturity is insulated from bad
consumption shocks today. This generates lower expected returns on growth stocks than
value stocks.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Finally, section 5 explains in detail the equilibrium dynamics of the two driving forces:
4the wealth distribution and the collateral ratio. It shows how these interact to deliver high
equity premia, volatile equity premia, and high Sharpe ratios when collateral is scarce.
The appendix provides proofs of the propositions, it details an additional procedure to
calibrate the average housing collateral ratio, it describes the computational algorithm, and
it discusses the model's implications for unconditional asset pricing moments.
1 Model
Since the focus of our paper is on the quantitative asset pricing predictions, we keep the
discussion of the model brief.
1.1 Environment
Uncertainty The economy is populated by a continuum of in¯nitely lived households. The
structure of uncertainty is twofold: s = (y;z) is an event that consists of a household-speci¯c
component y 2 Y and an aggregate component z 2 Z. These events take on values on a
discrete grid S = Y £ Z. We use st = (yt;zt) to denote the history of events. St denotes
the set of possible histories up until time t. s follows a Markov process with transition







0jy;z) 8z 2 Z;y 2 Y:
Because of the law of large numbers, ¼z(y) denotes both the fraction of households drawing
y when the aggregate event is z and the probability that a given household is in state y when
the aggregate state is z.7
Preferences We use fxg to denote an in¯nite stream fxt(st)g
1
t=0. There are two types
of commodities in this economy: a consumption good c and housing services h. These
commodities cannot be stored. The households rank consumption streams according to the
7The usual caveat applies when applying the law or large numbers. We implicitly assume the technical































The parameter Ã > 0 converts the housing stock into a service °ow, ° captures the degree
of relative risk aversion, and " is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between non-
durable consumption and housing services.8
Endowments The aggregate endowment of the non-durable consumption good is denoted
fcag. The growth rate of the aggregate endowment depends only on the current aggregate
state: ca
t+1(zt+1) = ¸(zt+1)ca
t(zt). Each household is endowed with a labor income stream
f´g. The labor income share ^ ´(yt;zt) = ´(yt;zt)=ca(zt), only depends on the current state





0;z) = 1; 8z;t ¸ 0:
The aggregate endowment of housing services is denoted fhag and ½(zt) denotes the
relative price of a unit of housing services. The calibration speci¯es a process for the ratio of
non-housing expenditures and housing services expenditures frg, r(zt) =
ca(zt)
½(zt)ha(zt), rather
than for fhag directly.
Trading Each household is assigned a label (`;s0), where ` denotes the time-zero collateral
wealth of this household. The cross-sectional distribution of initial non-labor wealth and
income states (`;s0) is denoted L0.9 We let fc(`;s0)g denote the stream of consumption and
we let fh(`;s0)g denote the stream of housing services of a household of type (`;s0). The
8The preferences belong to the class of homothetic power utility functions of Eichenbaum and Hansen
(1990). Special cases are separability (" = °¡1) and Cobb-Douglas preferences (" = 1).
9So, ` denotes the value of the initial claim to housing wealth as well as any ¯nancial wealth that is in zero
net aggregate supply. In the model there is no ¯nancial wealth in positive net supply, but in the calibration
we consider augmenting the collateral stock to include realistic values of other ¯nancial wealth.
6¯nancial markets are complete: households trade a complete set of contingent claims a in
forward markets, where at(`;st;s0) is a promise made by agent (`;s0) to deliver one of unit
the consumption good if event s0 is realized in the next period. These claims are in zero
net supply, and trade at prices qt(st;s0).10 All prices are quoted in units of the non-durable
consumption good. There are frictionless rental markets and markets for home ownership;
ownership and housing consumption are separated. The rental price is ½t(zt); ph
t(zt) denotes
the (asset) price of the housing stock. Because of the law of large numbers, these prices only
depend on aggregate histories.
At the start of each period, the household purchases non-housing consumption in the
spot market ct(`;st), housing services in the rental market hr
t(`;st), contingent claims in the
¯nancial market and ownership shares in the housing stock ho












































Collateral Constraints Households can default on their debts. When the household
defaults, it keeps its labor income in all future periods. The household is not excluded from
trading, even in the same period. However, all collateral wealth is taken away. As a result,
the markets impose a solvency constraint that keeps the households from defaulting: all of
a household's state-contingent promises must be backed by the cum-dividend value of its
housing owned at the end of period t, ho
t+1. In each node st, households face a separate














; for all s
t;s
0: (4)
10This setup is equivalent to having ¯nancial intermediaries trade in state contingent claims and provide
insurance to the households (Atkeson and Lucas (1993)).
7As in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), these constraints are not too tight: they allow for the
maximal degree of risk sharing, given that agents cannot be excluded from trading, while
preventing default.
1.2 Equilibrium Asset Prices
Competitive Equilibrium. Given a distribution over initial non-labor wealth and initial





such that (i) for given prices and initial wealth, the allocation solves
each household's maximization problem (1) s.t. (2), (3) and (4), and (ii) the markets for the
consumption good, the housing services, the contingent claims and housing ownership shares
clear.
As in other endogenously incomplete markets models, assets are priced by the uncon-
strained agents at every date and state (Alvarez and Jermann (2000)). These unconstrained
households have the highest intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS), equal to


































The second equality follows from the form of the utility function, the de¯nition of the expen-
diture ratio r = ca
½ha, and market clearing in the housing market.11 No arbitrage implies that
the return on any security j, R
j




There are two driving forces in the model: the income process and the non-housing expen-
diture ratio.







"; 8i. Since there is one economy-




Consequently, all households equate their non-housing to housing consumption ratios r(zt).
8Income Process The ¯rst driving force in the model is the Markov process for the non-
durable endowment process. It has an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component. The
aggregate endowment growth process is taken from Mehra and Prescott (1985) and replicates
the moments of aggregate consumption growth in the 1871-1979 data. Aggregate endowment
growth, ¸, follows an autoregressive process:
¸t(zt) = ½¸¸t¡1(zt¡1) + "t;
with ½¸ = ¡:14;E(¸) = :0183 and ¾(¸) = :0357. We discretize the AR(1) process with
two aggregate growth states z = (ex;re) = [1:04;:96] (for expansion and recession) and an
aggregate state transition matrix [:83;:17;:69;:31]. The implied ratio of the probability of
a high aggregate endowment growth state to the probability of a low aggregate endowment
growth state is 2.65. The unconditional probability of a low endowment growth state is
27.4%. This matches the observed frequency of recessions.
The idiosyncratic labor income volatility in the US increases in recessions (Storeslet-
ten, Telmer and Yaron (2004)). Our calibrated labor income process shares this feature.
Following Alvarez and Jermann (2001), log labor income shares follow an AR(1) process
with autocorrelation of .92, and a conditional variance of .181 in low and .0467 in high
aggregate endowment growth states. Discretization into a four-state Markov chain re-
sults in individual income states (´1(hi;ex);´1(lo;ex)) = [:6578;:3422] in the high and
(´1(hi;re);´1(lo;re)) = [:7952;:2048] in the low aggregate endowment growth state.12 We
refer to the counter-cyclical labor income share dispersion as the Mankiw (1986) e®ect.
Expenditure Ratio The second driving force in the model is the process for the ratio
of non-housing to housing expenditures frg. Following Piazzesi et al. (2004), we specify an
autoregressive process which also depends on aggregate endowment growth ¸:
logrt+1 = ¹ r + ½r logrt + br¸t+1 + ¾rºt+1; (6)
12The one di®erence with the Storesletten et al. (2004) calibration is that recessions are shorter in our
calibration. In their paper the economy is in the low aggregate endowment growth state half of the time.
That implies that the unconditional variance of our labor income process is lower.
9where ºt+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal process with mean zero, orthogonal to ¸t+1. In our
benchmark calibration we set ½r = :96, br = :93 and ¾r = :03. The parameter values come
from estimating equation (16) on US data.13 We discretize the process for log(r) as a ¯ve-
state Markov process. A second calibration switches o® the e®ect of consumption growth
by setting br = 0. Both calibrations ¯x ¾r = :03. We choose the constant ¹ r to match the
average housing expenditure share of 19% in the data (NIPA, 1929 to 2004).
Average Housing Collateral Ratio A key quantitative question is whether collateral is
su±ciently scarce for our borrowing constraints to have a large e®ect. Because this question
is an important one, we consider two measures to calibrate the average ratio of collateral
wealth to total wealth. The ¯rst measure focuses on housing collateral, the second measure
includes non-housing sources of collateral.
We measure factor payments to housing wealth as total US rental income and factor
payments to human wealth as labor income (compensation of employees). NIPA data show
that rental income was 3.4% of rental income plus labor income in 1946-2002 and 4.3% in
1929-2002. Because the factor payments ratio maps directly into the housing collateral ratio,
the data suggest a housing collateral ratio less than 5%.14
To be on the safe side, our second estimate is a broad collateral measure. It includes
¯nancial wealth, the market value of the non-farm non-¯nancial corporate sector in the US.
We add interest payments and dividend payments to the income stream from collateralizable
wealth and we add proprietary income to the income stream from non-collateralizable wealth.
The factor payment ratio increases to 8.6% in the post-war sample and 9.4% in the full sample
(row 2), suggesting a housing collateral ratio less than 10%.
An alternative approach is to compare the collateralizable wealth to income ratio in
model and data. Assuming that the expected return on total collateralizable assets is 9%
and the expected dividend growth rate is 3%, then a collateral ratio of 5% implies a collateral
wealth-to-income ratio of 85% according to Gordon's growth formula: :85 = :05=(:09¡:03).
Likewise, the implied wealth-to-income ratio is 150% when the collateral ratio is 10%. In
13Table 1 in a separate appendix shows regression estimates for ½r and br.
14If r is constant, the housing collateral ratio or the ratio of housing wealth to total wealth is
1=r
1+1=r =
1=(1+ r). This is a very good approximation for the average collateral ratio in the model with stochastic r.
10US data, the 1929-2004 average ratio of mortgages to income is 55%. If we include ¯nancial
wealth, that ratio increases to 155%. This approach also points towards a housing collateral
ratio of 5% and a broad collateral ratio of 10%.15
Finally, Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989) estimate human wealth to be 93% of total wealth,
implying a collateral ratio of 7%.
We take the model with a 5% collateral ratio as our benchmark and consider the econ-
omy with a 10% collateral ratio as an alternative. To simultaneously match the average
expenditure share of housing services (¹ r) of 19% and the average ratio of housing wealth to
total wealth (my) of 5% or 10%, we scale up the aggregate non-housing endowment.
Preference Parameters In the benchmark calibration, we use additive utility with dis-
count rate ± = :95, coe±cient of relative risk aversion ° = 8, and intratemporal elasticity
of substitution between non-housing and housing consumption " = :05. We ¯x the relative
weight on housing in the utility function Ã = 1 throughout.16 Because our goal is to explain
conditional moments of the market return as well as the cross-section of returns, we choose
the preference parameters to match key unconditional asset pricing moments for the market
return (see section D of the appendix). We also compute the model for ° 2 f2;5;10g and












In NIPA data (1930-2004), the left hand side of (7) is .046 and the right-hand side is .041.
The implied " is .098. A higher choice for " simply implies excessive rental price volatility.
Stock Market Return We de¯ne the stock market return as the return on a leveraged
claim to the aggregate consumption process fca
tg and denote it by Rl. In the data, dividends
15The Gordon growth model is an approximation. Appendix B provides a detailed analysis of this asset
value approach to calibrating the collateral share. It reports that the benchmark calibration (my = 0:05)
produces a collateral wealth-to-income ratio of 96%. If the average my were to be calibrated higher, there
would have to be a lot more tradeable wealth in the US economy.
16The degree of relative risk aversion ¡cucc
uc = ( rt
1+rt)° +( 1
1+rt)"¡1 is a linear combination of ° and " with
weights depending on the non-durable expenditure ratio rt. In the simulations r = 4:26 on average, so that
the weight on ° is .81 on average. Because rt is not very volatile, neither is the degree of risk aversion.
11are more volatile than aggregate consumption. We choose leverage parameter · = 3, where
¾(¢logdt+1) = ·¾(¢logca
t+1).17 We also price a non-levered claim on the aggregate con-
sumption stream, denoted Rc. The excess returns, in excess of a risk-free rate, are denoted
Rl;e and Rc;e. Table 1 summarizes the benchmark parametrization and the other values we
consider in the sensitivity analysis.
[Table 1 about here.]
Computation Our computational strategy is to keep track of cross-sectional distributions
over wealth and endowments that change over time. Appendix C provides the algorithm.
In the next section, we show that our model can explain the US history of equity premia
and excess returns when we feed in the actual aggregate consumption growth and collateral
shocks that the US economy experienced over the last seven decades.
3 Time Series Variation in Returns
In this section, we show that the model captures important features of conditional asset
pricing moments: (i) the same return predictability as in the data, and, (ii) highly volatile
Sharpe ratios. But ¯rst we highlight the model's long-run predictions, using the last seven
decades in the US as a testing ground. The value of housing wealth to income shifts dra-
matically over this period. At the onset of the Great Depression, the mortgage-to-income
ratio increases from 25 percent to 50 percent because house prices do not decline as quickly
as national income. The ratio subsequently decreases to a minimum of 12 percent by the
end of WW-II. After that, the ratio increases almost without interruption to a value of 100
percent today. We focus on three key features of the data: (i) the decline in the volatility
of returns and the risk-free rate, (ii) the low-frequency variation in the average risk-free
rate, and (iii) the long-run decline in the equity premium since WW-II. Taking as given the
observed evolution of the housing collateral ratio, the model replicates all three features.
17For the period 1930-2004, the volatility of annual nominal dividend growth is 14.8%, whereas the volatil-
ity of annual nominal consumption growth (non-durables and services excluding housing services) is 5.6%, a
ratio of 2.6.
12Data We use two distinct measures of the housing collateral stock: the value of outstanding
home mortgages (MO) and the market value of residential real estate wealth (RW). These
time series are from the Historical Statistics for the US (Bureau of the Census) for the period
1889-1945 and from the Flow of Funds (Federal Board of Governors) for 1945-2001. We use
both the value of mortgages and the total value of residential wealth to allow for changes
in the extent to which housing can be used as a collateral asset. National income is labor
income plus net transfer income from the Historical Statistics of the US for 1926-1930 and
from the National Income and Product Accounts for 1930-2001.18
3.1 Model Meets Twentieth Century Data
We feed the observed aggregate consumption growth shocks and the observed housing col-
lateral ratio between 1929 and 2003 into the model. To match the frequency of recessions in
the data, we de¯ne a recession as a year in which aggregate consumption growth drops one
standard deviation below its sample mean. We use two di®erent measures for the collateral
ratio: mortgages to national income, MOt
Yt , and residential wealth to national income RWt
Yt .
We equate the percentage deviations of fMOt
Yt g and fRWt
Yt g from their sample average in the
data to the percentage deviations of my in the model by feeding in the right rt process.19
Declining Risk Premium and Risk-free Rate Volatility The ¯rst panel of Table 2
documents a stunning long-run decrease in the volatilities of excess stock market returns
and risk-free rates. The standard deviation of excess stock returns declines from 30% in the
1930s to 10% in the 1990s, while the standard deviation of the risk-free rate declines from
around 7% to 2%. While in°ation was more volatile in the early decades, the volatility of
the risk-free rate cannot be accounted for by in°ation surprises alone. The second column
(¾(r
f
ex¡post)) reports annual risk-free rates computed from annualizing the di®erence between
the monthly three-month T-bill rate minus the in°ation rate in the same month. The
third column subtracts the previous month's in°ation rate instead (¾(r
f
ex¡ante)). The small
18The data appendix in Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005a) provides detailed sources.
19The two series MOt
Yt and RWt
Yt are potentially non-stationary. When we use the collateral ratio in re-
gressions, we compute the deviations from a co-integrating relationship between log(Yt) and log(MOt), or
log(RWt). The resulting series are stationary. Details are provided in Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005a)
and the data are downloadable from the authors' web sites.
13di®erence between the two suggests this volatility is not exclusively due to in°ation surprises.
Most asset pricing models target a stable risk-free rate, but the stability of the risk-free rate
is a recent phenomenon. Our model can account for this radical decline in volatility.
[Table 2 about here.]
The model matches the volatility decline in returns. In the benchmark calibration (panel
2 of Figure 2), the standard deviation of the return on an un-levered claim to aggregate
consumption declines from 36% percent in the 1930s to 12% in the 1990s when we use the
mortgage-based collateral measure (column 1); it declines from 23% to 12% for the residential
wealth-based measure (column 3). The model also delivers a steep decline in risk-free rate
volatility: from 21% to 11% in column 2 and from 16% to 11% in column 4. While this
decline is consistent with the data, the model induces too much volatility in the risk-free
rate. A modi¯ed version of our model with Epstein and Zin (1991)-type preferences solves
this problem.20 An increase in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to 0.2 from .125,
while keeping the risk aversion coe±cient constant at its benchmark value of 8, allows us to
roughly match the volatility. Panel 3 shows that the risk-free volatility now declines from
10% to 3%, in line with the data. At the same time, this model preserves the steep decline
in the stock return volatility: from 29% to 4%.
Level of the Risk-free Rate The risk-free rate is low when housing collateral is scarce,
both in the model and in the data, because the demand for insurance pushes up the price
of future consumption. To focus on the long-run dynamics we compute the 9-year moving
average of the one-year risk-free rate in the data and in the model. The top row of Figure
3 plots the data, the bottom row plots the model-generated data; the left panel uses the
mortgage-based measure and the right panel uses the residential wealth-based measure.
The data reveal a strong positive correlation between the long-run risk-free rate and the
housing collateral measure: 0.75 in the left panel and 0.83 in the right panel. The initial
increase in housing collateral in the late 1920s coincides with an increase in the risk-free rate.
At the start of the 1930s, the risk-free rate declines precipitously and this decline coincides
20The details of the model with Epstein-Zin preferences are available in a separate appendix.
14with a decline in the housing collateral ratio. During WW-II, the federal government did
keep real interest rates arti¯cially low. In the post-war period, the two series continue to
co-move until the mid-1990s.
The model produces a similar low-frequency pattern for the risk-free rate. The bottom
row of Figure 3 shows that the model predicts the decline in the risk-free rate in the Great
Depression, the increase in the late 1940s, the decline in the 1960s, the rise in the 1970s,
and the decline in the 1980s and early 1990s. Since the mid-1990s, the model predicts an
increase in the risk-free rate because housing collateral has become more abundant. One
notable divergence is that the increase in housing collateral in the last 10 years did not lead
to a commensurate increase in the interest rate.21
[Figure 3 about here.]
Equity Premium Finally, our model generates a long-run decline in the equity premium
as well as large unexpected return in the 1990s. Many authors have argued that the equity
premium has declined substantially over the last four decades. Jagannathan et al. (2000)
use Gordon's growth formula to back out the equity premium and conclude it has declined
from 8% in the 1940s to 1% in the 1990s. Fama and French (2002) argue that, because of
a decrease in the equity premium, capital gains were much higher than expected, especially
in the 1990s. Because housing collateral became more abundant since the 1940s, our model






) declines from 10.6% in the 1940s and a high of 11.2% in the
1960s to 5.5% in the 2000s (¯rst column of Table 3). The model also generates the large
unexpected capital gains of the 1990s. The second column reports the sample average of the
realized excess return in each decade, E[Re
t+1]. The realized return in the 1990s is 15.4%,
much higher than the equity premium of 7.5%.
[Table 3 about here.]
The decade-by-decade averages somewhat understate the extent of the decline in the
equity premium. The left panel on the top row of Figure 4 contrasts the low and the high
21We conjecture that this may be due to the unprecedented out°ow of tradeable wealth from the US in
the last decade. This is a topic for future research; the current model abstracts from this.
15frequency variation by plotting the model-predicted annual equity premium (dashed line)
alongside the 9-year moving-average (solid line). The vertical bars denote recession years.
The equity premium is always higher at the onset of a recession. The equity premium peaks
at 15% in the early 1940s, while it reaches a low of 3.5% in 2002. At the same time, the
conditional volatility of excess stock returns declines from a high of 25% in the early 1930 to
a low of 15% in 2002 (left panel on the middle row). Over the same period, the conditional
Sharpe ratio declines from .70 to .35 (left panel bottom row).
The predicted variation in conditional excess return moments looks similar to the data.
The right panels of ¯gure 4 plot the empirical counterpart to the equity premium, the
conditional volatility and the conditional Sharpe ratio of excess returns. To construct these
measures, we project realized excess stock return and its realized volatility (constructed
from daily data) on the housing collateral measure and the real risk-free rate. Because the
housing collateral ratio is slow-moving, we can interpret the projected series as capturing a
long-run equity premium and long-run conditional volatility. The conditional Sharpe ratio
is the ratio. The equity premium also peaks in the early 1940s around 15% and declines to
5% at the end of the sample (top right panel). The conditional volatility also goes from 25%
to 15% (middle panel), and the Sharpe ratio falls by more than half (bottom panel).
[Figure 4 about here.]
3.2 Long Horizon Predictability
If expected returns are vary over time with the housing collateral ratio, then we should ¯nd
that the housing collateral ratio predicts returns. An important question is whether the
model can quantitatively replicate the predictability coe±cients found in the data.
Panel 1 of table 4 shows results from predictability regressions of long-horizon excess
returns on the lagged housing collateral scarcity measure in the data.22 Results are reported
22Collateral scarcity is measured as f myt =
max(myt)¡myt
max(myt)¡min(myt), where max(myt) and min(myt) are the
sample maximum and minimum of fmytg. This ratio is always between 0 and 1. The measure is based on
outstanding residential mortgages. Collateral is scarcer when myt is lower. Details on the computation of
myt are provided in Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005a) and the data are downloadable from the authors'
web sites.
16for horizons up to 8 years and for two samples, and are taken from Lustig and Van Nieuwer-
burgh (2005a). The main ¯ndings are that excess returns are higher when collateral is scarce
(b1 > 0). The e®ect becomes larger and statistically more signi¯cant with the horizon and
the R2 increases.
Panel 2 shows that the model replicates the pattern of predictability coe±cients surpris-
ingly well. It reports regression results inside the model of excess returns on our measure of
housing collateral ratio scarcity. When housing collateral is scarce (my is low), the excess
return is high. The magnitude of the slope coe±cients is close to the one we ¯nd in the data.
Moreover, the R2 of the predictability regression increase with the predictability horizon,
just as in the data. We ¯nd this negative relationship between myt and the excess return
for a non-levered claim, as well as for a levered claim to aggregate consumption (· = 3).
[Table 4 about here.]
The predictability literature has identi¯ed other variables that predict returns, such as
the price-dividend ratio and the risk-free rate. In the data, a lower price-dividend ratio and
a lower risk-free rate forecast both higher future returns and higher excess returns. In our
model, a lower price-dividend ratio (risk-free rate) forecasts higher (lower) future returns,
but lower (higher) future excess returns. This pattern is due to the risk-free rate dynamics.
When collateral is scarce, the price of insurance increases, lowering the risk-free rate and
pushing up the price-dividend ratio. The theory predicts that the equity premium is high in
such periods. Because of the persistence in the housing collateral ratio, future equity premia
are also high. This must mean that future realized excess returns are high on average.
However, the high excess returns are the result of lower realized returns and even lower
future risk-free rates.23
Sharpe Ratio in the Data Does our model generate enough volatility in the Sharpe
ratio and does the Sharpe ratio co-move correctly with the housing collateral ratio? To
evaluate our model against the data, we estimate the Sharpe ratio on annual data from
1927-1992 and compare it to the variation in the Sharpe ratio generated by the model. The
23Results for the data and model are available upon request.
17conditional mean return is the projection of the excess return on the housing collateral ratio,
the dividend yield and the ratio of aggregate labor income to consumption, all of which have
been shown to forecast annual returns.24 Likewise, the conditional volatility is the projection
of the standard deviation of intra-year monthly returns on the same predictors. We form
the Sharpe ratio as the ratio of the predicted excess returns and predicted volatility. Table
5 shows the estimation results for 1 year returns (column 1), but also for 5 year and 10-year
cumulative excess returns (columns 2 and 3). The last three rows of the table indicate the
unconditional mean and standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio as well as its correlation with
the housing collateral ratio. In the estimation, the correlation between the Sharpe ratio and
the measure of collateral scarcity f my is positive in the data and equal to .25, .32, and .50 for
1, 5 and 10 year cumulative excess returns. The volatility of the Sharpe ratio on 1, 5 and
10 year cumulative excess returns is .10, .18, and .20. For quarterly returns (1952-2000), the
volatility of the Sharpe ratio is .45 (Lettau and Ludvigson (2003)).
[Table 5 about here.]
Similar to the data, our model generates volatile Sharpe ratios, and Sharpe ratios that
co-move correctly with the housing collateral ratio. The correlation between the Sharpe
ratio and f my is also positive: .50, .59 and .39 for 1, 5 and 10 year cumulative excess returns
on a non-levered consumption claim. The unconditional Sharpe ratio volatility is .40, .42,
.40. Other models have a hard time generating this much volatility. For example, the
unconditional standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio is .09 for the Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) model and the consumption volatility model of Lettau and Ludvigson (2003).
4 Cross-sectional Variation in Risk Premia
The second main set of results are about the model's cross-sectional asset pricing impli-
cations. Firms with a high ratio of book value to market value of equity (value ¯rms)
historically have higher returns than those with a low book-to-market ratio (growth ¯rms).
24See Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005a), Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), and Santos and Veronesi
(2004) respectively. The data, as well as the measurement of the housing collateral ratio are spelled out in
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005a).
18Panel 1 of Table 6 reports sample means, volatilities, and Sharpe ratios for the excess returns
on ten book-to-market deciles. The annual excess return on a zero-cost investment strategy
that goes long in the highest book-to-market decile and short in the lowest decile is 6.8%
for 1930-2003 and 6.5% for 1945-2003. The Sharpe ratios for the highest and lowest decile
portfolios are .56 and .37 for 1945-2003 and .42 and .32 for 1930-2003.25
The paper's second main result is that the collateral model can endogenously generate this
value premium. We perform two exercises to substantiate this claim. In the ¯rst exercise we
generate excess returns on value decile portfolios from an empirically plausible factor model.
In a second exercise, we impose a speci¯c timing on the cash °ows of value and growth
portfolios and compute returns on these portfolios.
[Table 6 about here.]
4.1 Plugging the Empirical Betas into Model
Value stocks command higher expected returns because their returns co-vary more strongly
with aggregate consumption growth when collateral is scarce (Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh
(2005a)). In a ¯rst step, we use data on the decile value portfolio returns to describe the
return-generating process for each of the book-to-market decile portfolios. We then price
these returns inside the model and show that returns on high book-to-market portfolios
carry a higher risk premium than returns on low book-to-market portfolios. The return
spread in the model matches the spread in the data.
Decile Return Processes in Data To estimate the relationship between excess returns
on book-to-market decile portfolios and the model's state variables (c;r; f my), we use data on
aggregate consumption growth, expenditure share growth, and the housing collateral ratio




















r;my f myt+1¢logrt+1 + º
j
t+1; (8)
25Similar value premia are found for monthly and quarterly returns and for quintile instead of decile
portfolios. Using quarterly data for 1951-2002, unconditional Sharpe ratios for value stocks (.64) are twice
as large as for growth stocks (.32) (Lettau and Wachter (2005)).
19by OLS. The estimates are reported in table 2 of the separate appendix. When collateral
is abundant (f myt = 0), the sensitivity of excess returns to aggregate consumption growth
is ¯c (Figure 5, left column). The returns on value stocks (decile 10) are high in recessions
while growth stocks (decile 1) are much less sensitive to aggregate consumption growth; j¯cj
increases monotonically from decile 1 to decile 10. When collateral is scarce ( f myt = 1), the
consumption beta is ¯c+¯c;my (right column). Value stocks are more sensitive to consumption
growth shocks when collateral is scarce: ¯c;my > 0 is much higher for the tenth decile than
for the ¯rst decile portfolio. This sensitivity pattern results in higher expected returns for
value stocks than for growth stocks. This e®ect is reinforced because value stocks are also
more sensitive to aggregate expenditure ratio shocks; ¯r increases monotonically for both
collateral measures (not shown).
[Figure 5 about here.]
Decile Return Processes in Model In a second step, we generate ten excess return










and simulated model state variables. For each excess return, the intercept ¯
j
0 is chosen to
make the Euler equation hold: Et[mt+1R
j;e
t+1] = 0. This ensures that the model SDF prices
the book-to-market decile returns correctly on average. We then simulate the model for
10,000 periods and compute unconditional means and standard deviations of each decile
portfolio return.
The second panel of table 6 reports the excess returns on the ten value portfolios pre-
dicted by the collateral model, ordered from growth (B1) to value (B10) for the benchmark
parametrization. We use two sets of empirical factor loadings corresponding to di®erent
housing collateral measures. For the mortgage-based collateral measure, the value spread is
6.8%, matching the data. For the residential wealth measure, the value spread is even larger:
8.4%. Furthermore, the model predicts that the Sharpe ratio of the tenth decile (value) is
double that of the ¯rst decile (growth), similar to the post-war data. Figure 2 (in the in-
troduction) plots the return di®erence between deciles 2-9 and the lowest book-to-market
portfolio for the model and for the data. The model does quite well in reproducing these
spreads; if anything, the model's spreads are too large.
20Representative Agent Model In the representative agent economy, there are no collat-
eral constraints and perfect risk sharing obtains. This amounts to setting f my = 0 in equation
(8). The estimated consumption growth and expenditure growth betas exhibit little varia-
tion across decile portfolios. The simulated returns that these betas imply, do not generate
a value premium, and lower Sharpe ratios on value stocks than on growth stocks, all at odds
with the data.26
4.2 Pricing Stocks with Di®erent Duration
Growth stocks have been described as assets with longer maturities than value stocks (De-
chow, Sloan and Soliman (2002) and Lettau and Wachter (2005)). The second approach
models growth stocks (value stocks) as a basket of consumption strips that is weighted to-
wards longer (shorter) maturities. A period-k consumption strip is a claim to aggregate
consumption ct+k, k years from the current period t.
The multiplicative (one year) equity premium E0Re
0;1[fckg], the expected return on a non-
levered claim to the entire stream of aggregate consumption fckg1
k=1 divided by the risk-free













The second term in the sum is the (gross) expected return on a period k consumption
strip E0R0;1 [ck] divided by the (gross) risk-free rate R0;1 [1]. The weight !k represents the
value of the period k consumption strip relative to the total value of all consumption strips.
Mk is the pricing kernel in period k. It is linked to the stochastic discount factor m by
Mk = m1 £ ¢¢¢ £ mk. (See appendix A for the derivation of equation 9).
We think of value stocks as a claim to a di®erently weighted stream of aggregate consump-
tion ffv(k)ckg1
k=1, where the function f(¢) puts more weight on the consumption realizations
in the near future. For example, fv(k) = Ceak, where a is a negative number and C is a
normalization constant, C =
P1
k=1 ck P1
k=1 eakck. Likewise, growth stocks are a claim to a weighted
stream of aggregate consumption ffg(k)ckg1
k=1, where f(¢) puts more weight on the con-
26Detailed results available upon request.
21sumption realizations in the far future. For example, fg(k) = Ceak, where a is a positive
number. The multiplicative equity premium e º0 on such a basket of consumption strips with
weights f(k) is:










The following proposition shows that the properties of the pricing kernel determine the
sign of the value spread. Appendix A proves that, if the pricing kernel has no permanent
component, then the highest risk premium is the one on the farthest out consumption strip
(k ! 1). The model generates a growth premium.
Proposition 1. If ° > 1, f(k) = Ceak with a > 0 and if limk!1
E1Mkck
E0Mkck = 1, then lima!1 1+
e º0 = limk!1 Re
0;1[ck] ¸ 1 + º0, for any sequence of weights f!kg in the de¯nition of the
multiplicative risk premium º0.
The proof draws on insights from Alvarez and Jermann (2005). The pricing kernel in
our model contains a permanent component stemming from the risk of binding solvency
constraints, even in the absence of the consumption growth shocks.27 Such a permanent
component is a necessary condition for generating a value premium.
Representative Agent Economy In the representative agent economy, the equity premia
on consumption strips do not change with the horizon. This is easy to show for additive
preferences that are separable in both commodities and aggregate endowment growth that
is i.i.d with mean ¹ ¸.28 The pricing kernel is simply a function of the aggregate consumption






1 . Because the aggregate
endowment grows every period at the rate ¸, M1c1 = ¸
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27Section 5 explains that the aggregate weight shock, which measures the extent of binding solvency
constraints and enters as a multiplicative term in the SDF, is a non-decreasing stochastic process.
28A similar result obtains if preferences are non-separable and aggregate expenditure share growth is i.i.d.,
even when aggregate expenditure share growth is correlated with aggregate consumption growth.
22The expression does not depend on the horizon k, meaning that strip risk premia are constant
across horizons. Since the term structure of consumption risk premia is °at, the value
premium is zero.
Term Structure of Strip Premia and Time-Varying Value Premia Our model
behaves like a representative agent economy when housing collateral is abundant. These
are times when the term structure of risk premia is nearly °at. However, collateral scarcity
generates a downward sloping term structure of risk premia. Since the model oscillates
between abundant collateral (°at term structure) and scarce collateral (downward sloping
term structure), it generates a downward slope on average. This generates a value premium,
because value stocks load more heavily on short duration consumption strips. Put di®erently,
because short term assets are more risky than long term assets, the expected return and
Sharpe ratio are higher for value stocks than growth stocks.
The downward sloping term structure relies crucially on having two model driving forces
that operate at di®erent horizons: changes in aggregate consumption growth, which cause
shocks to the wealth distribution, at business cycle frequencies and changes to the collat-
eral ratio at low frequencies. Risk premia on long-maturity assets respond mostly to low-
frequency collateral changes, whereas short-maturity assets respond to both shocks. Suppose
that collateral is scarce and there is a negative aggregate consumption growth shock (a re-
cession). This shock resolves risk, because it lowers the likelihood of being constrained in
the immediate future (the left tail of the wealth distribution is `cleansed'). The risk pre-
mium decreases. But the risk-free rate increases by more so that the discount rate increases.
Higher discount rates imply lower prices. But because the aggregate consumption growth
shock is temporary, it only lowers the price of short-maturity assets and not the price of
long-maturity assets. In section 5, we will be more explicit about the wealth distribution
dynamics that drive this.
Prices and expected returns are inversely related, so that the term structure of expected
returns is downward sloping. Put di®erently, expected returns on value stocks increase
because short-duration assets have higher consumption growth risk when collateral is scarce.
For long-duration assets such as growth stocks, only long-term discount rates matter. These
23are governed by the housing collateral ratio and not by aggregate consumption growth.
If there is only one driving force, as in the habit formation model, a fall in aggregate
consumption increases marginal utility growth not just today, but persistently into the future.
Therefore, it generates a bigger price decline of long-duration consumption strips than of
short-duration strips. The term structure of risk premia is upward sloping. The habit model
predicts a growth premium (Lettau and Wachter (2005)).
Panels 1 and 2 of Figure 6 plot the expected return and Sharpe ratio on consumption
strips of horizons of 1 to 45 years for the benchmark model. Long-maturity strips have risk
premia and Sharpe ratios that are lower than those for short-maturity strips. This pattern
can be traced back to their di®erential consumption risk.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Finally, panel 3 of Table 6 reports equity premia on claims to fCeakckg. These are baskets
of consumption strips of di®erent maturities, where the constant a governs the duration of
the basket. The leverage parameter · is 2. We vary a from .5 to -.5. The corresponding
baskets have a duration between 43 years and 2 years (row 1). We think of the baskets
with long-duration as the growth portfolios and the baskets with short-duration as the value
portfolios (Dechow et al. (2002)). The benchmark model generates a maximum value spread
of 5.2% between the 8-year and the 43-year portfolios, close to the value spread in the data.
In addition, the Sharpe ratios on the value portfolios are much higher than the Sharpe ratios
on the growth portfolios. The bottom row of Figure 6 con¯rms that long-duration assets
(growth stocks) have lower risk premia and lower Sharpe ratios.
To summarize, when confronted with the actual aggregate consumption growth shocks
and the actual housing collateral ratio, the model delivers the same low frequency changes
in the level and volatility of the equity premium and the risk-free rate that we document in
the data. It generates the same predictability patterns and volatile Sharpe ratios as in the
data. In addition, the model matches the cross-sectional variation in risk premia on book-
to-market sorted stocks. The last section explains in detail how movements in the housing
collateral ratio induce variation in Sharpe ratios. This section can be skipped by readers
mainly interested in the asset pricing results.
245 Inside the Model
This section explains the model's equilibrium dynamics in detail. To characterize the equi-
librium consumption dynamics and link these to the state prices of consumption, we use
stochastic consumption weights.
5.1 Equilibrium Consumption Dynamics and the Collateral Ratio
We use a simple risk-sharing rule to characterize the equilibrium consumption choices for
each household in an equivalent time zero trading environment.29
Let »t(`;st) be the cumulative Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint (4) at
time t for household (`;s0). When the constraint does not bind, its Lagrange multiplier is
zero, and the household's cumulative multiplier remains unchanged. But when the constraint
binds, the multiplier increases to a cuto® level »
t(yt;zt). This cuto® is the consumption share
at which the collateral constraint holds with equality. Note that the cuto® only depends on







»t¡1(`;st¡1) if »t¡1(`;st¡1) > »
t(yt;zt)
»
t(yt;zt) if »t¡1(`;st¡1) · »
t(yt;zt)
(10)
The aggregate weight process »a
t (zt) summarizes to what extent collateral constraints bind



















































29A separate appendix derives the equivalence of equilibria in these two trading environments if interest
rates are high enough in the sense of Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
25We verify in a separately available appendix that this rule satis¯es the ¯rst order condition for
non-housing and housing consumption and the market clearing conditions. Combining (11)
and (10), when a household switches to a state with a binding constraint, its consumption




t . Shocks to »a
t (zt) re°ect aggregate shocks to the wealth distribution. Because they
follow from an inability to insure against human wealth shocks, these can be interpreted as
liquidity shocks.
Combining the risk-sharing rule (11) for unconstrained households (»t+1(`;st+1) = »t(`;st))






















For future reference, we denote the equilibrium price of a claim to some payo® stream fdg












where Mt;t+j = mt+1mt+2 :::mt+j is the j-period ahead pricing kernel.
A Benchmark Economy The perfect commitment environment provides a useful bench-
mark for understanding asset prices. Because households are never constrained, the in-
dividual multiplier stays constant at its initial value: »t(`;st) = »0(`;s0). The aggregate
weight process re°ects the initial wealth distribution and is constant: »a





°d©0(z0).30 Consumption shares are constant, consumption levels only move with
aggregate consumption and there is full insurance. All agents equate their IMRS and the
SDF is the standard Breeden-Lucas pricing kernel, adjusted for a composition factor that
arises from the non-separability between non-housing and housing consumption. It contains
only the ¯rst two factors in (12).
30©0 is the initial distribution of multipliers »0, a monotone transformation of the initial wealth distribution
L0.
26A Multiplicative Discount Factor Adjustment The third term in (12) is the growth
rate of the aggregate consumption weight process »a
t+1, raised to the power of risk aversion °.
It re°ects the departure from full commitment and measures the risk of binding solvency con-
straints. When many households are severely constrained in state zt+1 (»a(zt+1) > »a(zt)),
the price of consumption in that state is high, because the unconstrained households expe-
rience high marginal utility growth: When lots of households run into binding constraints
and experience consumption share increases, the unconstrained households have to experi-
ence large decreases in their consumption shares. The increase in the price of consumption
induces them to accept low consumption growth rates. When nobody is constrained, the
aggregate consumption weight process stays constant, »a(zt+1) = »a(zt), and the represen-
tative agent SDF re-emerges. The risk of binding solvency constraints endogenously creates
heteroscedasticity in the SDF.
Housing Collateral The novel feature of this model is that the tightness of the con-
straints, and therefore the size of the multiplicative adjustment to the SDF, depends on the




¦zt [fca + ha½g]
=
¦zt [fcar¡1g]
¦zt [fca (1 + r¡1)g]
: (13)
The numerator measures the value of collateralizable wealth; it equals the price of a claim
to the aggregate housing dividend. The denominator is the sum of collateralizable housing
wealth and non-collateralizable human wealth. If the expenditure ratio r is constant, the
collateral ratio equals 1
1+r. If r varies over time in a persistent manner, then the housing





t and therefore the amount of risk sharing that can be sustained and equilibrium
asset prices. We formalize this in the following two propositions, proven in appendix A.
If the total housing claim is su±ciently valuable, then perfect risk sharing can be sus-
tained.
Proposition 2. Let ¦¤[f¢g] denote the price of that claim under perfect risk-sharing and let














z;y [f´(y;z)g] for all (y;z) 2 Y £ Z
This condition guarantees that each household can consume the average endowment without
violating its collateral constraint. The following proposition states that an economy with
more housing collateral (lower r) has lower cuto®s », thereby allowing for more consumption
smoothing. Such an increase in the supply of collateral brings the cuto® consumption share
closer to its lower bound of zero. In the limit perfect risk-sharing obtains. Conversely, a
decrease in the supply of collateral (higher r) brings the cuto® rules closer to their upper
bound, the labor income shares ^ ´. In the limit, as the collateral disappears, the economy
reverts to autarky (no risk sharing).
Proposition 3. Assume utility is separable and consider two economies, denoted by super-
scripts 1 and 2. If r1
¿(z¿) < r2
¿(z¿); 8z¿ ¸ zt then the cuto®s satisfy »
1(yt;zt) · »
2(yt;zt). As
r¿(z¿) ! 1 for all z¿ ¸ zt, »(yt;zt) ! ^ ´(yt;zt). Conversely, as r¿(z¿) ! 0 for all z¿ ¸ zt;
»(yt;zt) ! 0.
Di®erences in the r process a®ect the equilibrium aggregate multiplier process »a. An
economy with a uniformly lower housing collateral (higher r) process has higher liquidity
shocks and lower average interest rates (or equivalently higher average state prices):
Corollary 1. Assume utility is separable and consider two economies, 1 and 2. Fix the dis-
















, and the state prices are higher on average in the second economy.
The last proposition and corollary compare two economies with di®erent collateral processes
frg to illustrate the mechanism that underlies time-variation in the market price of risk.
Computation These aggregate weight shocks play a key role in the numerical computation
of equilibria. To solve the model numerically, we rely on an approximation of the growth




t¡1(zt¡1) using a truncated history of aggregate
shocks. This is discussed in detail in appendix C.
285.2 Two Driving Forces
To build intuition for the asset price results, we ¯rst explain the two main driving forces of
the model: shocks to the wealth distribution, operating at business cycle frequencies, and
variation in the housing collateral ratio, operating at low frequencies. Both of these forces
a®ect the SDF mt+1 in (12) through its third term g
°
t+1, which is a function of the aggregate





Shocks to the Wealth Distribution Because risk sharing is imperfect, the higher cross-
sectional income dispersion in a low aggregate consumption growth state results in more
wealth and consumption dispersion. First, the household cuto® levels are higher in low aggre-
gate consumption growth states, »(yt;zt¡1;re) > »(yt;zt¡1;ex), and this makes the consump-
tion increase for households that switch to a state with a binding constraint larger. Second,
low aggregate consumption growth states are short-lived in our model and agents are more
constrained in these states as a result, because of their desire to smooth out its e®ect on their
consumption. As the combined result of these two forces, the size of the aggregate weight
shock increases more in low aggregate consumption growth states (gt+1(zt;re) > gt+1(zt;ex)).
However, after a low consumption growth shock accompanied by a large aggregate weight
shock gt+1, the left tail of the wealth distribution is cleansed, and subsequent aggregate
weight shocks are much smaller. This cleansing mechanism lowers the conditional market
price of risk ¾t[mt+1=Et[mt+1] and increases the interest rate after a bad shock. These wealth
distribution dynamics operate at business cycle frequencies and are also present in Lustig
(2003). They are a ¯rst source of heteroscedasticity in the SDF.
Housing Collateral Mechanism There is another source of heteroscedasticity: low fre-
quency changes in the housing collateral ratio. This paper's novel feature are movements in
the housing collateral ratio that come from exogenous movement in the non-housing expen-
diture ratio r together with endogenous movements in the SDF (equation 13).
Figure 7 illustrates the collateral mechanism for a typical two hundred period simulation
of the benchmark model. Panel 1 plots the housing collateral ratio my (bold, right axis) to-
gether with the expenditure ratio r (single line, left axis). It shows that the housing collateral
29ratio increases when households spend a larger share of income on housing. The persistence
of my comes from this relationship. Panel 2 plots the cross-sectional consumption growth
dispersion (single line, left axis) against the housing collateral ratio my (bold line, right axis).
It summarizes the risk sharing dynamics in the model. When collateral is scarce, more house-
holds run into binding collateral constraints. To prevent default, the consumption share of
the constrained households increases. At the same time, the unconstrained households' con-
sumption share decreases precipitously (see equation 11). As a result, the cross-sectional
standard deviation of consumption growth increases, evidence of less risk-sharing. For ex-
ample, in a period of collateral abundance (period 126), ¾t[¢logct+1] is 8.1%, whereas in
a period of collateral scarcity (period 174), it is only 0.9%.31 The aggregate weight shock
gt+1, plotted in panel 3, measures the economy-wide extent to which the solvency constraints
bind. It also governs the new component to the SDF g
°
t+1. The panel illustrates that when
collateral is scarce, constraints bind more frequently and more severely and this is re°ected
in a large aggregate weight shock. For example, in period 126 the liquidity shock is 1.07,
whereas in period 174 it is only 1.01. The SDF is higher and more volatile in such periods of
collateral scarcity, and quite di®erent from the representative agent SDF. The next panels
illustrate how this impacts asset prices.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Equity premium The fourth panel of ¯gure 7 shows that the conditional expected excess
return on a non-levered claim to aggregate consumption Et[R
c;e
t+1] (dotted line, left axis) is
higher in periods of collateral scarcity (full line right axis). The conditional equity premium
is 13.5% when my is low (period 126), but only 4.5% when the housing collateral ratio is
high (period 174). The ¯fth panel shows that the conditional volatility of the excess return
on the consumption claim (left axis) is 10.3% when collateral is abundant (period 174) and
more than doubles to 24% when collateral is scarce (period 126). The net result of the




t+1]) that is higher in times
31As an aside, even though the consumption shares change in important ways when collateral constraints
bind, the unconditional volatility of consumption growth for an individual household is moderate. In our
benchmark model it is less than 10% of the unconditional volatility of individual income growth. There is
still a considerable amount of risk-sharing.
30of collateral scarcity (sixth panel). It is .34 in period 174 and almost .57 in period 126.
Figure 8 summarizes the conditional asset pricing moments somewhat di®erently. It plots
the averages of these conditional asset pricing moments against the value of the collateral
ratio. The entire time-series of conditional asset pricing moments is computed, then averaged
over histories of the aggregate state (zt¡1;¢¢¢ ;zt¡k), sorted according to whether the last
aggregate shock realization zt was high (dashed line) or low (full line), and then sorted
according to my. The ¯rst row of the ¯gure replicates ¯gure 1, except that it discriminates
between whether the current realization of the aggregate state is high or low. Concentrating
on the dashed lines, the equity premium is 9% higher when collateral is scarce (my = .04)
than when it is abundant (my = .10) in the ¯rst panel. The other two panels in the top row
match our earlier ¯ndings of higher conditional volatility and Sharpe ratios when collateral is
scarce.32 The bottom row shows that the conditional market price of risk ¾t[mt+1]=Et[mt+1],
an upper bound on the Sharpe ratio, is higher when collateral is scarce (panel 4). The
price-dividend ratio in panel 5 is also higher when collateral is scarce because the demand
for insurance against binding solvency constraints drives up the price of stocks. It also drives
up the price of bonds. So, the model simultaneously generates a high equity premium and a
high price-dividend ratio because the risk-free rate is low when collateral is scarce (panel 6).
[Figure 8 about here.]
These are the dynamics of asset prices that underly our main results in sections 3 and 4.
5.3 Unconditional Asset Pricing Moments
Finally, Appendix D discusses the model's unconditional asset pricing moments. The model
matches the mean equity premium and its volatility, the mean Sharpe ratio, and the mean
risk-free rate for the benchmark parametrization. A representative agent economy is unable
to deliver these results, even if preferences are non-separable between housing and non-
housing consumption. Our model has one major drawback: it generates too much volatility
in the risk-free rate. We show that an increase in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
32The slight non-monotonicity for low collateral ratios comes from the Chebychev approximation used to
compute policy functions.
31goes a long way towards mitigating this problem. Furthermore, the lower volatility of the
risk-free rate in the post-war era masks an important, and often overlooked stylized fact:
The volatility of the risk-free rate has changed substantially from decade to decade in the
US. We argued in section 3 that this is not simply a measurement issue due to changes in
in°ation volatility, and we showed that our model is consistent with this long-run decline in
risk-free rate volatility.
6 Conclusion
Our paper shows how endogenous, state-contingent borrowing constraints interact with
shocks in the housing market to deliver plausible asset pricing predictions. Equilibrium
changes in the value of the housing stock change the degree to which risk sharing takes
place, and modify households' ability to commit to allocations and prices. For a plausibly
calibrated housing collateral process, we signi¯cantly improve on the predictions of the canon-
ical consumption-based asset pricing model along three dimensions: time-series variation in
conditional asset pricing moments, cross-sectional variation in returns, and unconditional
asset pricing moments. The housing collateral mechanism, in combination with the wealth
distribution shocks, endogenously generate time-varying volatility in the Sharpe ratio on
equity, whereas in other models this feature is built into the preferences or the consumption
dynamics.
In a recent paper, Daniel and Titman (2005) question the success of a string of recent
(conditional) CCAPM papers in explaining the cross-section of size and value returns. Their
point is that one only needs two factors to explain returns along the two risk dimensions size
and value. What is needed then to tell the models apart is more over-identifying restrictions
(more asset pricing moments), and other (non-asset pricing) evidence. We have taken the
second route in other work. In this paper, we chose the ¯rst route. We have tried to match
not only the cross-section of risk premia, but also the time-variation in returns on equity
and debt, not only at business-cycle frequencies, but also at lower frequencies.
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38Figure 1: Summary Conditional Asset Pricing Moments.
The ¯gure plots the expected excess return on a claim to aggregate consumption (panel 1), its conditional standard deviation
(panel 2) and its Sharpe ratio (panel 3). All series are averaged over histories and plotted against the housing collateral ratio,
the ratio of housing wealth to total wealth (housing plus human wealth). The model simulation, discussed in section 2.1, uses
the benchmark calibration, discussed in section 2.2.
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39Figure 2: Return Spreads in Book-to-Market Portfolios
This graph plots returns of the 9 highest book-to-market decile portfolios in excess of the return on the ¯rst decile portfolio. It
plots the model-implied return spreads on the horizontal axis against the return spreads observed in the data (vertical axis).
The stock returns on the book-to-market decile portfolios are from Kenneth French's web site. the data are annual for the period
1945-2003. The ¯rst panel shows model-generated spreads computed using a mortgage-based collateral measure. The second
panel uses a residential wealth-based collateral measure. The model simulation uses the benchmark calibration, discussed in
section 2.2, and the computation is detailed in section 4.2.
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40Figure 3: Time-Variation in Risk-free rate: Data and Model.
The two plots in the ¯rst row of the ¯gure plot the 9-year moving average of the annual T-bill rate and the
collateral ratio in the data (dashed line). In the left panel the housing collateral ratio is measured as the
percentage deviation of the mortgage-based collateral measure from its long-run trend (MO=Y ). The right
panel uses the residential wealth-based collateral measure (RW=Y ). The annual risk-free rate is computed
from monthly de°ated T-Bill returns: r
f
t;t+1 = 12 £ ((1 + it;t+1)(1=12) ¡ (1 + ¼t;t+1)), where i is the annual
nominal holding period return on 3-month T-bills from CRSP and ¼ is the monthly in°ation computed from
the BLS consumer price index. The panels in the second row plot the same statistics for the benchmark
model. I.e., we feed in the observed aggregate consumption growth and housing collateral data and compute
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41Figure 4: Time-Variation in Equity Premium: Model and US Data
This panel plots the conditional expected excess stock market return, its conditional standard deviation
and the conditional Sharpe ratio in the model (left column) and in the data (right column). The model-
simulated data were generated by feeding in observed aggregate consumption growth fztgT=2000
t=1929 and the
observed collateral ratio, measured based on mortgages fMOt
Yt gT=2000
t=1929 into the benchmark model. The top
panel plots the expected excess return on a claim to aggregate consumption. The middle panel plots the
conditional standard deviation of the excess return on a claim to aggregate consumption. The bottom
panel plots the conditional Sharpe ratio, the ratio of the expected excess return over its standard deviation.
In the right column all conditional asset pricing moments are constructed from the data in the following
way. The expected excess return, plotted in the top right panel, is computed by projecting the annual
CRSP value-weighted stock return in excess of the annual return on the Fama 3-month T-bill return on the
mortgage-based housing collateral ratio and the Fama 3-month T-bill return (less in°ation over the previous




k ¡(1+i)1=360)2. We use daily S&P500 data from Global Financial Data before
1960, and daily CRSP data afterwards. The expected standard deviation is computed by projecting this
standard deviation on two lags, the mortgage-based housing collateral ratio and the Fama 3-month T-bill
return (less in°ation over the previous year). The bottom right panel plots the conditional Sharpe ratio, the
ratio of the expected excess return over its standard deviation.
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42Figure 5: Beta Estimates for Book-to-Market Decile Returns in Data.
This ¯gure plots consumption betas when collateral is abundant (left panels) and when collateral is scarce (right panels) for
ten book-to-market decile portfolios. The portfolios are organized from the lowest book-to-market decile (growth) on the left to
the highest book-to-market decile (value) on the right of each horizontal axis. The betas are estimated from OLS regression of
excess returns of the 10 book-to-market deciles on a constant, the collateral scarcity measure f myt, the aggregate consumption
growth rate ¢logca
t+1, the interaction term f myt¢logca
t+1, the aggregate expenditure ratio growth rate ¢logrt+1, and the
interaction term f myt¢logrt+1. These are the ¯ve risk factors in the collateral model. In the ¯rst panel the housing collateral
ratio is based on the value of outstanding mortgages; in the second panel the housing collateral ratio is based on the value of
residential real estate wealth. The data are annual for the period 1930-2003.


















































































































43Figure 6: Term Structure of Consumption Strips.
The ¯rst panel plots the conditional expected excess return on a levered claim to aggregate consumption k periods from now,
where k = 2;3;:::;45. The second panel shows the corresponding Sharpe ratios. Panel 3 plots the risk premium for the
duration-based portfolios against duration. Panel 4 plots the Sharpe ratio for the duration-based portfolios against duration.
The leverage parameter · is 2.
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44Figure 7: Risk Sharing, Conditional Asset Pricing Moments and Collateral Ratio
The graphs display a two hundred period model simulation under the benchmark parametrization (see Table 1). The shocks are
the same in each panel. The ¯rst panel plots the non-housing expenditure ratio r. The second panel plots the cross-sectional
standard deviation of consumption growth across households (¾t[¢logct+1]). The third panel is the aggregate weight shock
gt+1. The fourth panel plots the equity premium predicted by the model, i.e. the expected excess return on a non-levered claim

























. Each of these series are measured against the left axis and
plotted in a single blue line. The housing collateral ratio my is measured against the right axis and plotted in a bold red line.
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45Figure 8: Summary Conditional Asset Pricing Moments.
This graph reports average asset pricing moments from a long model simulation under the benchmark parametrization. All series
are averaged over histories (zt¡1;¢¢¢ ;zt¡k), sorted into low zt (¸(zt) = 0:96, full line) and high zt observations (¸(zt) = 1:04,
dashed line) and plotted against the housing collateral ratio (horizontal axes). The ¯rst row of the ¯gure plots the expected
excess return on a claim to aggregate consumption (panel 1), its conditional standard deviation (panel 2) and its Sharpe ratio
(panel 3). The second row plots the conditional market price of risk (panel 4), the conditional price-dividend ratio (panel 5),
and the risk-free rate (panel 6).
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46Table 1: Parameter Calibration












47Table 2: Decade-by-Decade Volatility of Asset Returns.
Panel 1 reports the volatility of excess stock returns and the risk-free rate in the data. Re is the excess return on the CRSP value-
weighted stock index. The nominal risk-free rate it;t+1 is the annual return on the CRSP 3-month T-bill rate. In°ation ¼t;t+1 is
computed from the BLS consumer price index series. Column 1 reports the annualized standard deviation of excess stock returns,
computed as the sample standard deviation of monthly excess returns, where Re
t+1 = 12£((1+Rt;t+1)¡(1+it;t+1)1=12). The
second column reports the annualized standard deviation of the ex-post risk-free rate r
f
t;ex¡post = 12£((1+it;t+1)(1=12) ¡(1+
¼t;t+1)). To minimize the e®ect of in°ation surprises, column 3 reports the annualized standard deviation of an ex-ante risk-free
rate which subtracts out the previous month's in°ation rate instead: r
f
t;ex¡ante = 12 £ ((1 + it;t+1)(1=12) ¡ (1 + ¼t¡1;t)). To
compute decade-averages, we only use the last month in each year. Panel 2 reports the same statistics for the model under the
benchmark parametrization. The model-simulated data were generated by feeding in observed aggregate consumption growth
fztgT=2000
t=1929 and the observed collateral ratio, measured either based on mortgages f MOt
Yt gT=2000
t=1929 or on residential wealth
f RWt
Yt gT=2000
t=1929 . If aggregate consumption growth at t is one standard deviation below the mean, zt is the low consumption
growth state, else zt is classi¯ed as the high consumption growth state. This procedure matches the unconditional probability
of a low aggregate consumption growth in the model to that in the data. In the model, Re is the excess return on an un-levered
claim to aggregate consumption. Panel 3 reports the same statistics as panel 2, but for a model with Epstein and Zin (1991)
preferences. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to 0.2 and the coe±cient of relative risk aversion is held at its








1931-1940 0:31 0:06 0:07
1941-1950 0:13 0:08 0:10
1951-1960 0:10 0:03 0:04
1961-1970 0:12 0:02 0:02
1971-1980 0:15 0:02 0:03
1981-1990 0:15 0:03 0:02
1991-2000 0:11 0:01 0:02









1931-1940 0:36 0:21 0:23 0:16
1941-1950 0:33 0:26 0:43 0:22
1951-1960 0:18 0:19 0:17 0:17
1961-1970 0:10 0:12 0:08 0:15
1971-1980 0:16 0:15 0:16 0:16
1981-1990 0:14 0:14 0:16 0:14
1991-2000 0:12 0:11 0:12 0:11









1931-1940 0:29 0:10 0:25 0:07
1941-1950 0:17 0:10 0:27 0:08
1951-1960 0:09 0:08 0:09 0:07
1961-1970 0:07 0:04 0:04 0:05
1971-1980 0:08 0:06 0:08 0:06
1981-1990 0:05 0:05 0:09 0:05
1991-2000 0:04 0:03 0:06 0:04
48Table 3: Decade-by-Decade Equity Premium.




t+1 is the excess return on an un-levered claim to aggregate consumption. We report the sample average of the conditional
expected excess return b E(Et[Re
t+1]) and the sample average of the realized excess return b E(Re
t+1) for each decade. The model-
simulated data were generated by feeding in observed aggregate consumption growth fztgT=2000
t=1929 and the observed collateral
ratio, measured either based on mortgages f MOt
Yt gT=2000










1931-1940 0:097 0:175 0:080 0:093
1941-1950 0:097 0:055 0:092 0:093
1951-1960 0:106 0:086 0:101 0:112
1961-1970 0:112 0:204 0:128 0:265
1971-1980 0:071 ¡0:015 0:077 ¡0:019
1981-1990 0:072 0:072 0:080 0:079
1991-2000 0:075 0:154 0:094 0:147
2001-2004 0:055 0:039 0:057 0:013
49Table 4: Predictability of K-Year Excess Returns: Data and Model.
Results of regressing log K-horizon excess returns on the housing collateral ratio. The intercept is b0, the slope coe±cient is b1.
The ¯rst panel reports the results in the data. The t-stats in brackets are computed using the Newey West covariance matrix
with K lags. The returns are cum-dividend returns on the value-weighted CRSP index. The collateral scarcity measure f myt
is based on the market value of outstanding mortgages. The long sample contains annual data from 1930-2003. The post-war
sample is from 1945-2003. The second panel reports the same regressions inside the model. The regressions were obtained by
simulating the model for 10,000 periods under the benchmark parametrization with leverage parameter · = 1 (left columns)
and · = 3 (right columns).
b0 b1 R2 b0 b1 R2
Panel 1: Data
Horizon Entire Sample Post-War Sample
1 0:01 0:15 0:02 0:02 0:15 0:04
[0:24] [1:25] [0:63] [1:73]
2 0:07 0:25 0:03 0:06 0:31 0:07
[0:66] [1:11] [0:83] [1:75]
3 0:16 0:31 0:03 0:12 0:46 0:09
[1:02] [0:97] [1:04] [1:80]
4 0:29 0:32 0:02 0:22 0:56 0:09
[1:50] [0:80] [1:42] [1:82]
5 0:38 0:47 0:03 0:34 0:66 0:08
[1:83] [1:16] [1:67] [1:77]
6 0:41 0:79 0:07 0:43 0:89 0:10
[1:70] [1:73] [1:58] [1:86]
7 0:41 1:20 0:12 0:49 1:26 0:14
[1:32] [2:11] [1:30] [2:02]
8 0:37 1:80 0:18 0:50 1:79 0:19
[0:91] [2:71] [1:01] [2:26]
Panel 2: Model
Horizon Leverage =1 Leverage=3
1 ¡0:00 0:13 0:01 0:03 0:12 0:00
2 ¡0:07 0:32 0:02 0:01 0:29 0:01
3 ¡0:16 0:54 0:03 ¡0:04 0:47 0:01
4 ¡0:29 0:81 0:04 ¡0:12 0:70 0:02
5 ¡0:45 1:11 0:06 ¡0:23 0:96 0:03
6 ¡0:62 1:42 0:07 ¡0:36 1:24 0:04
7 ¡0:81 1:77 0:09 ¡0:50 1:54 0:05
8 ¡1:01 2:12 0:11 ¡0:65 1:86 0:05
50Table 5: Long-Term Sharpe Ratios in Data.
the table reports coe±cient estimates for Re
t+1 = b0+b1Rt+b2dpt+b3lct+b4 f myt+"t+1 and V olt+1 = a0+a1dpt+a2lct+a3 f myt+
a4V olt + a5V olt¡1. The variables dp, lc and f my are the dividend yield, the labor income-consumption ratio, and the housing
collateral scarcity measure based on the value of mortgages. In particular f myt = max(myt) ¡ myt=(max(myt) ¡ min(myt)),
where max(myt) and min(myt) are the sample minimum and maximum of the housing collateral ratio my. Re denotes the
value weighted market return in excess of a 1 month T-bill return. V olt is the standard deviation of the 12 monthly returns in
year t. R1;R5;R10 denote the 1-year, 5-year and 10-year ahead cumulative excess returns. The estimation is by GMM with
the OLS normal conditions as moment conditions. Standard errors are Newey-West with lag length 3. The estimation period is
1927-1992, the longest common sample. The predicted Sharpe ratio is formed as the ratio of the predicted mean excess return
to the predicted standard deviation. The last three rows indicate the sample mean of the predicted Sharpe ratio, its sample
standard deviation, and the sample correlation between the Sharpe ratio and the housing collateral scarcity measure f my.
Regressors R1 Vol1 R5 Vol5 R10 Vol10
constant -.24 .09 .71 -.004 .76 .05
(s.e.) (.34) (.05) (0.28) (.04) (.42) (.04)
lag ret .04 .74 .76
(s.e.) (.13) (.13) (.08)
dp 1.07 .33 -1.20 .40 .26 .12
(s.e.) (2.00) (.27) (3.16) (.22) (3.00) (.21)
lc .22 -.07 -.76 .03 -.92 -.03
(s.e.) (.32) (.05) (.33) (.03) (.45) (.04)
f my .02 -.01 .48 -.04 .70 .01
(s.e.) (0.20) (.02) (.20) (.02) (.23) (.02)
lag vol .51 .96 .80
(s.e.) (.20) (.12) (.12)
2 lag vol -.18 -.19 .03
(s.e.) (.17) (.11) (.10)
E[Sharpe] .40 1.02 1.12
¾[Sharpe] .10 .18 .20
½[Sharpe; f my] .26 .32 .50
51Table 6: Value Premium in Data and in the Collateral Model
Panel 1 reports moments of book-to-market decile portfolio returns in excess of a risk-free rate: the sample mean, the sample
volatility and the Sharpe ratio. The risk-free rate is the annual return on a 3-month T-Bill. The value-weighted stock returns
on the book-to-market deciles are annual for 1930-2003 and 1945-2003, and the source is Kenneth French's web site. Panel 2
reports the decile returns generated by the model as described in section 5.1. The panel reports expected returns, standard
deviation and Sharpe ratio on an arti¯cial asset generated with a set of betas listed in Table 2 of the separate appendix, but with
intercept ¯
j
0 chosen so that the Euler equation is satis¯ed for this asset in the model. The parametrization is the benchmark
one. The ¯rst block corresponds to the betas obtained using the mortgage-based measure; the second block uses the residential
wealth-based measure. Panel 3 reports the results of the duration-based asset pricing exercise of section 5.2. It reports equity
premia (second row), their volatilities (third row), and Sharpe ratios (fourth row) for 10 portfolios of di®erent duration (¯rst
row). The leverage parameter · is 2.
Panel 1: US Data
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Sample 1930-2003
E(Re) 0:071 0:084 0:080 0:081 0:100 0:099 0:108 0:127 0:131 0:139
¾(Re) 0:222 0:194 0:196 0:229 0:228 0:238 0:250 0:274 0:291 0:332
E(Re)=¾(Re) 0:321 0:431 0:411 0:355 0:437 0:417 0:433 0:464 0:449 0:419
Sample 1945-2003
E(Re) 0:078 0:087 0:086 0:084 0:106 0:107 0:110 0:130 0:126 0:143
¾(Re) 0:209 0:175 0:175 0:178 0:182 0:178 0:194 0:214 0:212 0:257
E(Re)=¾(Re) 0:372 0:497 0:492 0:473 0:580 0:599 0:566 0:604 0:592 0:558
Panel 2: Model with Empirical Betas
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Mortgage-Based Collateral Measure
E(Re) ¡0:002 0:007 0:018 0:018 0:021 0:034 0:060 0:042 0:052 0:066
¾(Re) 0:104 0:065 0:081 0:093 0:107 0:110 0:145 0:130 0:123 0:153
E(Re)=¾(Re) ¡0:020 0:115 0:226 0:190 0:200 0:309 0:418 0:322 0:422 0:433
Residential Wealth-Based Collateral Measure
E(Re) 0:001 0:015 0:022 0:029 0:028 0:051 0:080 0:055 0:072 0:085
¾(Re) 0:116 0:062 0:076 0:088 0:106 0:131 0:178 0:149 0:159 0:191
E(Re)=¾(Re) 0:011 0:241 0:286 0:323 0:266 0:387 0:453 0:370 0:451 0:448
Panel 3: Model with Duration-Based Pricing
Duration 43:387 42:529 39:476 32:166 20:274 13:145 8:870 4:759 3:040 2:328
E[Re] 0:025 0:027 0:034 0:049 0:068 0:075 0:077 0:073 0:067 0:061
¾[Re] 0:191 0:193 0:196 0:202 0:202 0:198 0:192 0:175 0:157 0:142
E[Re]=¾[Re] 0:130 0:138 0:171 0:242 0:336 0:381 0:402 0:416 0:424 0:431
52A Technical Appendix
This section contains the proofs of the propositions in the main text. For more details on the model
(de¯nition of the cumulative multipliers, derivation and optimality of the risk sharing rule and the
optimality of the law of motion for the cumulative multipliers), we refer the reader to section 2 of
the separate appendix to this paper, available on our web sites.
Proof of Proposition 1 Following the de¯nition of Alvarez and Jermann (2005), the pricing




























Furthermore, for any return Et[
Mt+1
Mt Rt+1] = 1, we know that Et[log(
Mt+1
Mt Rt+1)] · logEt[
Mt+1
Mt Rt+1] =
0 by Jensen's inequality. This implies that Et log( Mt







¸ Et log(Rt+1) for any asset return Rt+1









Let f(k) = Ceak with a > 0 for growth stocks. In the absence of a permanent component in
the pricing kernel:
lim
a!11 + e º0 = lim
k!1
Rc
t+1;k ¸ 1 + º0 for any other sequence of weights f!kg
This implies that the highest equity premium is the one on the farthest out consumption strip. In
the absence of a permanent component in the pricing kernel, there is a growth premium. ¤
53Derivation of Value Premium The multiplicative risk premium on an (un-levered) con-
sumption strip is derived as follows:































Condition 1 Section F.1 in the separate appendix explains the equivalence between the static
and sequential budget constraints and solvency constraints. This equivalence holds only if interest
rates are high enough (see Alvarez and Jermann (2000)). We impose the following condition. Let
´max denote the highest possible labor endowment realization in each future, aggregate node zt.
Condition 1. Interest rates are said to be high enough if
¦z0;y0[f´maxg] < 1;
This is the equivalent of the condition in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) that interest rates be
high enough, translated to an economy with a continuum of consumers. In an economy with a
¯nite number of agents, it is su±cient to require the time zero value of a claim to the aggregate
endowment to be ¯nite, but here it is not su±cient for the value of a claim to the average endowment
to be ¯nite. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2 Denote the price of a claim under perfect risk-sharing by ¦¤[f¢g].












for all (y;z;r) with nonzero measure; © is the joint measure de¯ned on P(Y ) £ P(Z) £ B(R).
If this condition is satis¯ed, each household can get a constant and equal share of the aggregate
non-durable and housing endowment at all future nodes. That immediately implies that perfect
risk-sharing is feasible. If there is a value rmax such that any r0 > rmax is measure zero, then










z;y [f´(y;z)g] for all (y;z) 2 Y £ Z
This condition is su±cient, but not necessary. ¤
54Proof of Proposition 3 Assume utility is separable. Let C(`;yt;zt) denote the cost of claim
to consumption in state
¡
yt;zt¢
for a household who enters the period with weight » . The cuto®
rule »(yt;zt) is determined such that the solvency constrain binds exactly: ¦y;zt [f´g] = C(»;yt;zt),



















and »0 is determined by the cuto® rule (10). Note that the stochastic discount factor mt+1(zt+1)
does not depend on rt(zt) because we assumed that utility is separable. This also implies that the
cost of a claim to labor income ¦y;zt [f´g] does not depend on r.
We prove the result for a ¯nite horizon version of this economy. We ¯rst assume some arbitrary
state prices fpt(stjs0)g for both of these economies. fmt(zt)g denotes the SDF process implied
by these state prices. Finally, we use Ti to denote the operator that maps the aggregate weight
functions f»a
t (zt)g we start with into a new aggregate function f»
0;a
t (zt)g.














































T¡1(zT¡1) , this implies
that `1;c(yT¡1;zT¡1) < `2;c(yT¡1;zT¡1) for all (yT¡1;zT¡1). By backward induction we get that,





, `1;c(yt;zt) < `2;c(yt;zt) for all nodes (yt;zt) in the ¯nite horizon










) for all zt, with strict inequality if




























t (zt) is non-decreasing in »(yt;zt). The proof extends to the in¯nite horizon economy if the
















t(stjs0) is the representative agent state price. So if we start with the equilibrium state
prices for the second economy fp2





















t (zt)?g) = f»
1;a
t (zt)?g < T2(f»
1;a
t (zt)?g);
if we start with the equilibrium prices in the ¯rst economy. Now, it can be shown that Ti(f»0
t(zt)g) ·
Ti(f»t(zt)g) if f»0









t (zt)?g and T1(f»
1;a
t (zt)?g) = f»
1;a
t (zt)?g;









Proof of Corollary 1 Follows from the de¯nition of the cuto® level in the previous proof. For


















. This follows directly from the de¯nition of the aggregate
weight shock (14). As a result, »a
t (zt) is non-decreasing in »(yt;zt). This implies the state prices at
time 0 for consumption to be delivered in st are higher, and this is true for all nodes st.
Interest rates between time zero and time t are given by R
f
0;t = E0[M0;t]¡1, where the pricing





time t in all nodes st implies a lower pricing kernel on average and higher interest rates on average.
¤
B Asset Value Approach to Calibrating Housing Col-
lateral Ratio
In the main text we used factor payments on collateralizable and non collateralizable wealth to
calibrate the housing collateral ratio. Those data were taken from Table 1.12. National Income by
Type of Income (NIPA), except for the net interest series which comes from Table 1.13 (net interest
paid by domestic corporations, line 8). Here we describe a second approach, based on measuring
collateral wealth directly. More precisely, we compare the ratio of collateral wealth to total income
in the model and in the data.
We start by measuring the collateral wealth-to-income ratio in the data. Housing collateral
wealth is measured as the market value of outstanding mortgages. The residential mortgage series
56is from the Flow of Funds Tables and is available for the post-war period. Over that period, the
average ratio of residential mortgages to labor income plus rental income is 0.55. Financial wealth
is measured as the market value of non-farm non-¯nancial corporations in the US This series is
constructed based on Flow of Funds data; Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005c) provides the
details. Our broad measure of total collateral wealth to total income is constructed as the ratio
of residential mortgages plus ¯nancial wealth to labor income plus interest income plus dividend
income plus proprietor's income. That ratio is 1.55 in post-war data.
We compare these numbers to the housing collateral wealth-to-income ratio in the model. More
precisely, we ¯x an average housing collateral ratio my, simulate the model for a long period, and
compute the housing wealth to total income ratio. When my = 0:05, the collateral wealth to
income ratio is 0.90, in between the narrow and the broad empirical measure.
What is the e®ect of a higher housing collateral ratio in the model? When my is higher than
0.05, the collateral wealth-to-income ratio is actually lower than 0.90. To understand this, consider








where R is the expected rate of return on total wealth and g is the growth rate of total income. The
numerator is e®ectively the housing collateral ratio, for example 0.075. In the denominator, the
aggregate endowment growth rate g is the same across calibrations. Not so for the discount rate
R. This discount rate is the sum of the risk premium on a claim to aggregate consumption (the
equity premium) and the risk-free rate. In an economy with more collateral, the equity premium
goes down, but the interest rate goes up. This interest rate e®ect dominates the risk premium
e®ect, so that the denominator is increasing in my. It does not help to increase my to generate a
large collateral wealth to total income ratio. We ¯nd a higher wealth to income ratio of 0.96 for
my = 0:035 than the 0.90 for my = 0:05 and the 0.84 for my = 0:075.
The main point is that, with a ¯ve percent collateral ratio, our benchmark model allows for a
lot of collateral: 90% of the value of national income on average.
C Computing Stationary Equilibria
In this appendix we show how to compute stationary equilibria. As we noted in section 5, the
aggregate weight shock depends on the entire history of aggregate shocks z1. To avoid the curse
of dimensionality, we follow Lustig (2003) and truncate aggregate histories. Households only keep
track of the last k lags of the aggregate state, zk
t = (zt;zt¡1;¢¢¢ ;zt¡k), and the current expenditure
ratio rt(zt). The current expenditure ratio rt contains additional information not present in the
truncated history zk
t , namely rt¡k. For a household starting the period with weight » 2 ¥, the
policy function l(y0;z0;»;r;zk) : ¥ £ R £ Zk ! R produces the new individual weight in state
(y0;z0). There is one policy function l(¢) for each pair (y0;z0) 2 Y £ Z. The policy function
57g¤(z0;r;zk) : R £ Zk ! R forecasts the aggregate weight shock when moving to state z0 after
history (zk;r).
Competitive Equilibrium. A stationary stochastic equilibrium is a time invariant distribution
©¤
(r;zk) (»;y) over individual weights, individual endowments, current expenditure ratio, and trun-























is the transition function induced by the policy functions. The forecast of the











; 8z0 2 Z:
Intertemporal prices are pinned down by the stochastic discount factor in equation (12), using
the forecasted shock g¤(¢) as an approximation to the actual g(¢). For any given realization fzg,
the actual aggregate weight shock g(¢) di®ers from the forecast g¤(¢) because the distribution over
individual weights and endowments ©¤(¢) di®ers from the actual distribution ©(¢), which depends on
z1. The de¯nition of a stationary equilibrium implies that, on average, across aggregate histories,
©¤(¢) = ©(¢) and markets clear: The di®erence between actual consumption and consumption
based on a truncated history is zero on average, but not state-by-state. In each state z0, the
approximation error equals the percentage di®erence between the actual aggregate weight shock
and aggregate weight shock based on a truncated history:




This is the di®erence between consumption and the endowment. As the truncation parameter
k increases, the approximation error decreases because market clearing holds on average in long
histories. We use k = 5 lags in all our computations. The percentage allocation errors in (15)
provide a clear measure of the closeness to the actual equilibrium. For our benchmark calibration,
the average error in a simulation of 10,000 periods is only 0.0011 with standard deviation .0035.
The largest error in absolute value is 0.0282.
We compute the approximating equilibrium as follows. The aggregate weight shock process is
initialized at the full insurance value (g¤ = 1) and the corresponding stochastic discount factor is
computed. The cuto® rule for the individual weight shocks ensure that the solvency constraints
hold with equality. Then we generate a panel of data by simulating the model: fztgT
t=1 for T =
10;000 and fytgT






as the household's identifying label » (the re-scaling keeps the state variables
58stationary), and compute the sample mean of the aggregate weight shock fg¤
t(z0;r;zk)gT
t=1 and the
resulting stochastic discount factor fm¤
t(z0;r;zk)gT
t=1. A new cut-o® rule is computed with these
new forecasts. These two steps are iterated on until convergence.
D Unconditional Asset Pricing Moments
The model succeeds in matching most unconditional asset pricing moments, when we set ° equal
to eight, except for the volatility of the risk-free rate.
Risk Premium Table 7 compares the unconditional ¯rst and second moments of asset returns
in US data (panel 1), in the collateral model (panels 2 and 4), and in the representative agent model
(panel 3). The benchmark calibration in panel 2 generates a 8.6% risk premium on an un-levered
equity claim, with a volatility of 21.7%. These numbers line up with the 7.9% excess return in the
data and its 20.7% volatility. The Sharpe ratio is 0.397, close to the 0.384 Sharpe ratio observed
in 1927-2004. Because consumption growth is less volatile in the data than dividend growth, we
also compute a levered claim to aggregate consumption in the model (· = 3). The model with
lower risk aversion (° = 5) now also generates a sizeable and volatile (levered) risk premium: 3.9%
expected excess return with 16.7% standard deviation. We contrast this with a representative agent
economy. The equity premium on an un-levered (levered) consumption claim is less than one-third
(one-half) as big as in the collateral model, even though preferences are non-separable between
non-housing and housing consumption. Finally, doubling the collateral ratio to 10% brings this
economy closer to the representative agent economy because the solvency constraints are looser.
The expected excess return on a levered consumption claim is still high (5.7%) and volatile (21%)
for (° = 8;" = :05).
[Table 7 about here.]
Risk-free Rate The model with ° = 8 (° = 5) generates an average risk free rate of 2.6%
(7.7%), close to the 1.9% in the 1871-1979 data. The risk of binding collateral constraints increases
the expected SDF more when risk aversion ° is high, and pushes down the risk-free rate. There
are two reasons for this fall in the risk-free rate: Households cannot borrow as much, and they
accumulate more precautionary savings. When households are more risk averse, the precautionary
motive is stronger. They bid up the price of risk-free assets which provide insurance against the
risk of binding constraints. In contrast, the risk-free rate increases with ° in the representative
agent economy (panel 3). A more risk-averse representative agent is less willing to substitute inter-
temporally and wants to borrow more against growing labor income; this drives up the risk-free
rate. The level of the risk-free rate is much too high: 15.8% in the benchmark calibration.
The biggest shortcoming of the collateral model is the high unconditional volatility of the risk-
free rate. It is 7% in the economy with ° = 5, 15.6% in the economy with ° = 8, but only 4.2% in the
1927-2002 data and 5.2% in the 1871-1979 data. When the average collateral ratio is 10% instead,
59the risk-free rate is higher but less volatile (panel 4). Two forces drive this volatility: variation in the
expected fraction of households facing binding constraints due to shocks to the wealth distribution
(at higher frequencies), and shocks to the risk-sharing technology due to changes in value of housing
collateral (at lower frequencies). Both modulate the demand for insurance. As we argued in section
3, the model does generate a large decline in the risk-free rate volatility between the 1930s and the
1990s, consistent with the data.
Sensitivity: Recursive Utility One way to mitigate the risk-free rate volatility is to use
recursive preferences to de-couple risk aversion from the willingness to substitute consumption over
time. Raising the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.2 (with ° = 8) reduces the volatility
of the risk-free rate from 15.6% to 6.9% (panel 5). The equity premium is still 4.9% with a volatility
of 19.5%.The separate appendix reports more detailed results.
Sensitivity: Composition E®ect A higher intratemporal elasticity of substitution (") in-
creases the equity premium and the Sharpe ratio and lowers the risk-free rate (panel 6). This e®ect
also shows up in the representative agent economy; Piazzesi et al. (2004) refer to it as a nega-
tive composition e®ect. Assets that pay o® in low non-housing expenditure share growth states
are risky as such states occur in recessions (see equation 16). An increase in " from .05 to .75
increases the equity premium by 4% and decreases the risk-free rate by 4% in both our model
and the representative agent economy. Detailed results for the representative agent economy are
available upon request. However, these empirically plausible return moments come at the expense
of an implausibly high rental price growth volatility. For " = :75, the rental price growth volatility
¾(¢log½) is 19% per annum (see equation 7), whereas observed rental price growth volatility is
below 5%.Driving " even closer to 1 leads to exponentially increasing rental price growth volatility.
For " > 1 the representative agent model generates a negative equity premium. We choose " = :05
for our benchmark calibration because the rental price growth volatility then matches the data. A
higher " also increases risk-free rate volatility.
Sensitivity: Risk Aversion, Expenditure Share, and Income Heteroscedasticity
Varying the coe±cient of relative risk aversion ° from 2 to 10 (panel 7) increases the equity premium
on a levered (non-levered) consumption claim from 0.8% to 15.7% (.3% to 13.3%). The Sharpe
ratio increases from .07 to 0.55. The risk-free rate falls from 8.6% to -2.1%. When the expenditure
share does not depend on consumption growth (br = 0 in equation 16), the housing collateral ratio
becomes less volatile. The equity risk premium is now 6.9% with volatility 23.7%. The risk-free
rate is 1.8%, and its volatility is 3% lower than in the benchmark model (panel 8). Finally, we
shut down the Mankiw (1986) mechanism by having income shocks with the same dispersion in
booms as in recessions (panel 9). The housing collateral mechanism alone generates a sizeable 5.7%
equity premium. The risk-free rate is 5% higher, but 5% less volatile. We argued earlier that it is
important to have both the collateral e®ect and the counter-cyclical income dispersion at work to
generate a value premium.
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